First Year of the International Wheat Agreement by unknown
N O R T H DAKOTA" AGRICULTURAL E X P E R I M E N T STATION 11» 
First Year of the International 
Wheat Agreement 
B y B a l d u r H. K r i s t j a n s o n -
Early proponents of the International Wheat Agreement are 
pointing with pride to the first year's achievements July 31, 1950, 
marked the end of that year which saw over one-half of the totai 
world trade in wheat and flour move under the Agreement. 
There were difficulties to be overcome but they appear to 
have been met, at least for the time being. For instance, about 
half of the member countries were affected by currency devalua-
tion This meant an automatic increase in prices for these coun-
tries since their money had lower purchasing power m inter-
national trade. However, the fact that they could buy Agreement 
wheat at a lower price than wheat on the world market helped 
these countries directly in meeting the devaluation problem. An-
other temporary set-back occurred in-that four countries failed to 
sign or ratify the Agreement. On the other hand, six new countries 
joined the venture during the year.3 
Adjustments in Purchases and Sales 
A series of adjustments in purchases and sales were made 
within the first year of operations. These were made to meet con-
ditions created by the failure of countries to sign or ratify the 
Agreement and by the entry of new members to the family. The 
net result of these adjustments was an increase of 69 million bushels 
to the original 456 million bushels involved and a further increase 
in 1950-51, to a total of 536 million bushels. The U n i t e d S t a t e s 
quota was raised from 168 million to 236 million bushels in 1949-50, 
accounted for mainly by the accession of Western Germany. 
Approximately 90 per cent of the adjusted quotas were used 
by the importing nations. The principal deficiencies were recorded 
by Italy and Brazil, although some late-comers were unable to use 
up their allotments. This high rate of compliance on the part ot 
importing nations was stimulated of course by the fact that pur-
chases outside the Agreement had to be made at higher prices. 
Costs and Benefits to the United States 
The Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U. S. Department 
of Agriculture, estimates the Commodity Credit Corporation paid 
an average of 54 cents per bushel on Agreement sales to make up 
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the difference between the domestic price and the Wheat Agree-
ment price.1 These payments ranged from a low of 13 cents per 
bushel to a high of 69 cents.2 These deficits occurred at maximum 
prices permitted by the Agreement. If the U. S. had followed the 
policy of accepting the minimum prices provided (in which case 
the importing countries could have been called upon to take their 
allotment), a further payment by the C. C. C. of 30 cents per 
bushel would have been required.3 
On the credit side of the ledger Secretary Brannan points out 
that "our wheat and flour exports have been maintained at a level 
higher than would have been possible without the Agreement".1 
Certainly the results of the first year's operations are highly satis-
factory to those who seek to bring a greater degree of orderliness 
into the international wheat market through multilateral agree-
ments.2 This is not to deny the fact, however, that others would still 
prefer to see the previous system re-established on grounds that 
unrestrained competition is more effective. The argument rests 
upon two assumptions primarily: (1) that it is desirable to keep 
Government out of market operations wherever possible on the 
grounds that private efforts are more efficient, and (2) that the 
Agreement price is too low, resulting in substantial subsidies to 
foreign consumers. 
Unfortunately, the issues are not in fact clear-cut. International 
trade policies are destined to involve the innumerable facets of 
international politics for an indefinite number of years. Not the 
least of these considerations is the condition of the international 
stomach. For this reason, conclusive analyses are impossible, for 
they involve estimates of future conditions in the absence of a given 
program as well as the effectiveness of any particular measure 
undertaken. The best that can be expected is that our policies will 
be based upon informed opinion—the majority of such opinion be-
ing taken as correct in the short run. The International Wheat 
Agreement, if it stands the test of history yet unwritten, will stand 
because it served the broader needs of mankind rather than the 
needs of the marketplace. 
"See t h e Fo re ign Agr i cu l tu re Ci rcu lar of t h e Of f i ce of Fore ign A g r i c u l t u r a l Rela t ions , 
U . S. D . A., Oc tobe r 4, 1950, f o r f u l l de ta i l s of t h e m a t e r i a l p resen ted h e r e . 
=The Commodi ty Credi t . Corpora t ion supp l i ed 75.1 mi l l ion bushe l s of A g r e e m e n t w h e a t 
Commerc i a l o rgan iza t ions p rov ided 87.4 mil l ion bushe l s , app ly ing t o t h e C. C. C for 
p a y m e n t of 54 cen t s p e r b u s h e l o n t h e s e expor t s . 
' I t is i m p o s s i b l e to d e t e r m i n e precisely w h a t t h e ave rage pr ice for U. S, e x p o r t s would 
h a v e been in t h e a b s e n c e of t h e In t e rna t i ona l W h e a t A g r e e m e n t . I t is of i n t e re s t to 
note , howeve r , t h a t U. S. expor t s of w h e a t ou ts ide t h e A g r e e m e n t e x c e e d e d 100 mil l ion 
bushels . P a r t of t h i s w e n t to G e r m a n y , n o w a p a r t y to t h e Agreement . 
4Ibid. 
*The_ ou t look f o r U . S. _wheat supp l ies in t h e coming y e a r (1951-52) is r e p o r t e d in t h e 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Out look Digest , B u r e a u of Agr i cu l tu ra l Economics , October , 1950, to b e as 
t a l lows : If the ac reage seeded to w h e a t equa l s t h e na t iona l a l l o tmen t of 72.8 mi l l ion 
ac re s .and yie lds a r e ave rage , t h e 1951 c r o p would b e 1,150 mil l ion bushe l s . Th i s y e a r ' s 
o u t p u t w a s 1,010 „million. S ince s tocks n e x t J u l y a r e e x p e c t e d to b e a b o u t 450 mil l ion 
• i9-51"52. t ? V 5 0 0 mil l ion bushels . With domest ic consumpt ion 
e s t i m a t e d a t 730 mil l ion bushels , U . S. suppl ies p r o b a b l y would b e a d e q u a t e in an 
